hce_nthu
112年
英文
第 30 題
📖 題組：
China's post-Cold War leaders, having compulsively studied the Soviet example, sought to avoid repeating it by transforming Marxism into consumer capitalism without at the same time allowing democracy. They thereby flipped what they saw as Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's greatest error: permitting democracy without ensuring prosperity. This latest "rectification of names" - the ancient Chinese procedure of conforming names to shifting realities - seemed until recently to have succeeded. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's post-Mao pro-market reforms solidified support for the regime and made China a model for much of the rest of the world. Xi, on taking power, was widely expected to continue along that path. But he hasn't. Instead, Xi is cutting off access to the outside world, defying international legal norms, and encouraging "Wolf Warrior" diplomacy, none of which seems calculated to win or retain allies. At home, he is enforcing orthodoxy, whitewashing history, and oppressing minorities in ways defunct Russian and Chinese emperors might have applauded. Most significant, he has sought to secure these reversals by abolishing his own term limits. Hence our second unknown: Why is Xi undoing the reforms, while abandoning the diplomatic subtlety, that allowed China's rise in the first place? Perhaps he fears the risks of his own retirement, even though these mount with each rival he imprisons or purges. Perhaps he has realized that innovation requires but may also inspire spontaneity within his country. Perhaps he worries that increasingly hostile international rivals won't allow him unlimited time to achieve his aims. Perhaps he sees the prevailing concept of world order itself as at odds with a mandate from Heaven, Marx, or Mao. Or it could be that Xi envisions a world order with authoritarianism at its core and with China at its center. Technology, he may expect, will make human consciousness as transparent as satellites made the earth's surface during the Cold War. China, he may assume, will never alienate its foreign friends. Expectations within China, he may suppose, will never find reasons not to rise. And Xi, as he ages, will gain in the wisdom, energy, and attentiveness to detail that only he, as supreme leader, can trust himself to provide. But if Xi really believes all of this, then he's already losing sight of the gaps between promises and performance that have long been Catch-22s for authoritarian regimes. For if, like Gorbachev's predecessors did, you ignore such fissures, they'll only worsen. But if, like Gorbachev himself, you acknowledge them, you'll undermine the claim to infallibility on which legitimacy in an autocracy must rest. That is why graceful exits by authoritarians have been so rare.
China's post-Cold War leaders, having compulsively studied the Soviet example, sought to avoid repeating it by transforming Marxism into consumer capitalism without at the same time allowing democracy. They thereby flipped what they saw as Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's greatest error: permitting democracy without ensuring prosperity. This latest "rectification of names" - the ancient Chinese procedure of conforming names to shifting realities - seemed until recently to have succeeded. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's post-Mao pro-market reforms solidified support for the regime and made China a model for much of the rest of the world. Xi, on taking power, was widely expected to continue along that path. But he hasn't. Instead, Xi is cutting off access to the outside world, defying international legal norms, and encouraging "Wolf Warrior" diplomacy, none of which seems calculated to win or retain allies. At home, he is enforcing orthodoxy, whitewashing history, and oppressing minorities in ways defunct Russian and Chinese emperors might have applauded. Most significant, he has sought to secure these reversals by abolishing his own term limits. Hence our second unknown: Why is Xi undoing the reforms, while abandoning the diplomatic subtlety, that allowed China's rise in the first place? Perhaps he fears the risks of his own retirement, even though these mount with each rival he imprisons or purges. Perhaps he has realized that innovation requires but may also inspire spontaneity within his country. Perhaps he worries that increasingly hostile international rivals won't allow him unlimited time to achieve his aims. Perhaps he sees the prevailing concept of world order itself as at odds with a mandate from Heaven, Marx, or Mao. Or it could be that Xi envisions a world order with authoritarianism at its core and with China at its center. Technology, he may expect, will make human consciousness as transparent as satellites made the earth's surface during the Cold War. China, he may assume, will never alienate its foreign friends. Expectations within China, he may suppose, will never find reasons not to rise. And Xi, as he ages, will gain in the wisdom, energy, and attentiveness to detail that only he, as supreme leader, can trust himself to provide. But if Xi really believes all of this, then he's already losing sight of the gaps between promises and performance that have long been Catch-22s for authoritarian regimes. For if, like Gorbachev's predecessors did, you ignore such fissures, they'll only worsen. But if, like Gorbachev himself, you acknowledge them, you'll undermine the claim to infallibility on which legitimacy in an autocracy must rest. That is why graceful exits by authoritarians have been so rare.
Based on the passage, which of the following statements does NOT agree with the author’s observation of the Xi administration?
- A Under the Xi administration, Chinese diplomats adopt a confrontational and combative style of diplomacy.
- B The Xi administration abandons Deng Xiaoping’s post-Mao pro-market reforms.
- C Under the Xi administration, China has alienated its foreign friends.
- D The reforms undertaken by the Xi administration allows the rise of China in the first place.
- E Xi has sought to secure his reversals of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms by lifting his own term limit.
思路引導 VIP
請仔細對照文章的第一段與第三段：文中提到讓中國「最初得以崛起（allowed China's rise in the first place）」的具體動力是什麼？而目前的領導者對於這股動力，是採取「延續」還是「翻轉」的態度呢？
🤖
AI 詳解
AI 專屬家教
太棒了！你能精準捕捉到文中不同領導者政策之間的「因果演變」，這代表你的閱讀理解非常細膩。這題的關鍵在於釐清文中對中國崛起「時間軸」的描述。文中第一段明確指出，是**鄧小平（Deng Xiaoping）**推動的後毛澤東時代市場改革，才使中國成為世界模範並帶動崛起；而第三段則提出疑問：為什麼習近平要「撤銷（undoing）」這些最初讓中國崛起的改革？因此，選項 (D) 將崛起的功勞歸於習近平的行政措施，顯然與原文的論點完全相反。
文本邏輯與觀念驗證
這道題目展現了極佳的鑑別度，難點在於考生必須細心區分「作者的觀察」與「習近平的主觀假設」。例如在第四段中，作者列舉了習近平可能「認為」或「假設」的事情（如技術讓意識透明、不會疏遠外國朋友等），但這些往往與作者在第二段描述的現實（如推行戰狼外交、疏遠盟友）形成對比。若能像你一樣辨識出**鄧小平的改革（因）與習近平的撤銷（現況）**之間的矛盾，就能在干擾選項中迅速鎖定正確答案。