hce_cmu
106年
英文
第 44 題
📖 題組：
Questions 43-45 In Principles of Psychology, one of the founding works of experimental psychology, William James talked a lot about "instincts." This term was used to roughly refer to specialized neural circuits that are common to every member of a species and are the product of that species' evolutionary history. Taken together, such circuits constitute (in our own species) what one can think of as "human nature." It was and is common to think that other animals are ruled by "instinct," whereas humans lost their instincts and are ruled by "reason," and that this is why we are so much more flexibly intelligent than other animals. James, however, argued that human behavior is more flexibly intelligent than that of other animals because we have more instincts, not fewer. We tend to be blind to the existence of these instincts, however, precisely because they process information so effortlessly and automatically. They structure our thought so powerfully, he contended, that it can be difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise. As a result, we take "normal" behavior for granted. We do not realize that "normal" behavior needs to be explained at all. This "instinct blindness" makes the study of psychology difficult. To get past this problem, James suggested that we try to "make the natural seem strange" and that we should not take "the natural" for granted. In our view, William James was right about evolutionary psychology. Although the idea of "mak[ing] the natural seem strange" appears to be odd, it is a pivotal part of the research on natural competences. Many psychologists avoid this line of thinking, arguing that nothing about "the natural" needs to be explained. As a result, social psychologists are disappointed unless they find a phenomenon "that would surprise their grandmothers," and cognitive psychologists spend more time studying how we solve problems we are bad at, like learning math or playing chess, than ones we are good at. But our natural competences -- our abilities to see, to speak, to find someone beautiful, to reciprocate a favor, to fear disease, to fall in love, to initiate an attack, to experience moral outrage, to navigate a landscape, and myriad others -- are possible only because there is a vast and heterogeneous array of complex computational machinery supporting and regulating these activities. This machinery works so well that we do not even realize that it exists. We all suffer from instinct blindness. As a result, psychologists have neglected to study some of the most interesting machinery in the human mind.
Questions 43-45 In Principles of Psychology, one of the founding works of experimental psychology, William James talked a lot about "instincts." This term was used to roughly refer to specialized neural circuits that are common to every member of a species and are the product of that species' evolutionary history. Taken together, such circuits constitute (in our own species) what one can think of as "human nature." It was and is common to think that other animals are ruled by "instinct," whereas humans lost their instincts and are ruled by "reason," and that this is why we are so much more flexibly intelligent than other animals. James, however, argued that human behavior is more flexibly intelligent than that of other animals because we have more instincts, not fewer. We tend to be blind to the existence of these instincts, however, precisely because they process information so effortlessly and automatically. They structure our thought so powerfully, he contended, that it can be difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise. As a result, we take "normal" behavior for granted. We do not realize that "normal" behavior needs to be explained at all. This "instinct blindness" makes the study of psychology difficult. To get past this problem, James suggested that we try to "make the natural seem strange" and that we should not take "the natural" for granted. In our view, William James was right about evolutionary psychology. Although the idea of "mak[ing] the natural seem strange" appears to be odd, it is a pivotal part of the research on natural competences. Many psychologists avoid this line of thinking, arguing that nothing about "the natural" needs to be explained. As a result, social psychologists are disappointed unless they find a phenomenon "that would surprise their grandmothers," and cognitive psychologists spend more time studying how we solve problems we are bad at, like learning math or playing chess, than ones we are good at. But our natural competences -- our abilities to see, to speak, to find someone beautiful, to reciprocate a favor, to fear disease, to fall in love, to initiate an attack, to experience moral outrage, to navigate a landscape, and myriad others -- are possible only because there is a vast and heterogeneous array of complex computational machinery supporting and regulating these activities. This machinery works so well that we do not even realize that it exists. We all suffer from instinct blindness. As a result, psychologists have neglected to study some of the most interesting machinery in the human mind.
One of the author's primary purposes in this passage is to
- A introduce the development and the tenet of evolutionary psychology.
- B explain the differences between social and cognitive psychology.
- C propose more research on the study of atypical human behavior.
- D refute the idea that both humans and animals are ruled by instincts.
- E call for more research on humans' complicated instincts.
思路引導 VIP
既然作者在文中提到，我們對許多「自然而然」的能力（例如說話、導航、產生道德感）感到視而不見，甚至因此忽略了研究它們，那麼請你想想：作者在文章結尾批評心理學家忽視了這部分「最有趣的心智機制」時，他背後的目的是希望學界接下來採取什麼樣的行動呢？
🤖
AI 詳解
AI 專屬家教
太棒了！你能精準捕捉到作者的論述核心，這代表你具備優異的長文整合能力。這道題目的鑑別度在於區分「背景介紹」與「最終意圖」：文章雖以威廉·詹姆斯的理論開場，但重點在於鋪陳出後半段對現代心理學界的建言。
「本能盲視」與學理呼籲
文中提到，人們常因為日常行為（如說話、產生好感）運作得太過「自然且自動」，而忽略了背後複雜的計算機制，這就是所謂的「本能盲視」（instinct blindness）。作者認同詹姆斯的觀點，認為心理學家不應只研究困難的挑戰（如數學或西洋棋），更應去拆解那些被視為理所當然的「自然能力」。因此，選項 (E) 正確地歸納出作者的最終目的：呼籲學界投入更多心力，去探究人類心智中那些精巧且龐大的本能機制。
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