hce_nthu
111年
英文
第 29 題
📖 題組：
Sometimes it seems surprising that science functions at all. In 2005, medical science was shaken by a paper with the provocative title “Why most published research findings are false.” Written by John Ioannidis, a professor of medicine at Stanford University, the paper didn’t actually show that any particular result was wrong. Instead, it showed that the statistics of reported positive findings was not consistent with how often one should expect to find them. As Ioannidis concluded more recently, “many published research findings are false or exaggerated, and an estimated 85 percent of research resources are wasted.” It’s likely that some researchers are consciously cherry-picking data to get their work published. And some of the problems surely lie with journal publication policies. But the problems of false findings often begin with researchers unwittingly fooling themselves: they fall prey to cognitive biases, common modes of thinking that lure us toward wrong but convenient or attractive conclusions. “Seeing the reproducibility rates in psychology and other empirical science, we can safely say that something is not working out the way it should,” says Susann Fiedler, a behavioral economist at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, Germany. “Cognitive biases might be one reason for that.” Psychologist Brian Nosek of the University of Virginia says that the most common and problematic bias in science is “motivated reasoning”: We interpret observations to fit a particular idea. Psychologists have shown that “most of our reasoning is in fact rationalization,” he says. In other words, we have already made the decision about what to do or to think, and our “explanation” of our reasoning is really a justification for doing what we wanted to do—or to believe—anyway. Science is of course meant to be more objective and skeptical than everyday thought—but how much is it, really? Whereas the falsification model of the scientific method championed by philosopher Karl Popper posits that the scientist looks for ways to test and falsify her theories—to ask “How am I wrong?”—Nosek says that scientists usually ask instead “How am I right?” (or equally, to ask “How are you wrong?”). When facts come up that suggest we might, in fact, not be right after all, we are inclined to dismiss them as irrelevant, if not indeed mistaken. The now infamous “cold fusion” episode in the late 1980s, instigated by the electrochemists Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons, was full of such ad hoc brush-offs. For example, when it was pointed out to Fleischmann and Pons that their energy spectrum of the gamma rays from their claimed fusion reaction had its spike at the wrong energy, they simply moved it, muttering something ambiguous about calibration.
Sometimes it seems surprising that science functions at all. In 2005, medical science was shaken by a paper with the provocative title “Why most published research findings are false.” Written by John Ioannidis, a professor of medicine at Stanford University, the paper didn’t actually show that any particular result was wrong. Instead, it showed that the statistics of reported positive findings was not consistent with how often one should expect to find them. As Ioannidis concluded more recently, “many published research findings are false or exaggerated, and an estimated 85 percent of research resources are wasted.” It’s likely that some researchers are consciously cherry-picking data to get their work published. And some of the problems surely lie with journal publication policies. But the problems of false findings often begin with researchers unwittingly fooling themselves: they fall prey to cognitive biases, common modes of thinking that lure us toward wrong but convenient or attractive conclusions. “Seeing the reproducibility rates in psychology and other empirical science, we can safely say that something is not working out the way it should,” says Susann Fiedler, a behavioral economist at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, Germany. “Cognitive biases might be one reason for that.” Psychologist Brian Nosek of the University of Virginia says that the most common and problematic bias in science is “motivated reasoning”: We interpret observations to fit a particular idea. Psychologists have shown that “most of our reasoning is in fact rationalization,” he says. In other words, we have already made the decision about what to do or to think, and our “explanation” of our reasoning is really a justification for doing what we wanted to do—or to believe—anyway. Science is of course meant to be more objective and skeptical than everyday thought—but how much is it, really? Whereas the falsification model of the scientific method championed by philosopher Karl Popper posits that the scientist looks for ways to test and falsify her theories—to ask “How am I wrong?”—Nosek says that scientists usually ask instead “How am I right?” (or equally, to ask “How are you wrong?”). When facts come up that suggest we might, in fact, not be right after all, we are inclined to dismiss them as irrelevant, if not indeed mistaken. The now infamous “cold fusion” episode in the late 1980s, instigated by the electrochemists Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons, was full of such ad hoc brush-offs. For example, when it was pointed out to Fleischmann and Pons that their energy spectrum of the gamma rays from their claimed fusion reaction had its spike at the wrong energy, they simply moved it, muttering something ambiguous about calibration.
Which of the following would NOT illustrate “cognitive bias”?
- A Listening more often to information that confirms our existing beliefs.
- B Disproving evidence that questions our beliefs.
- C Letting an initial impression of a person influence what we think of them overall.
- D Claiming that something must be true because it is backed up by an authoritative figure on the subject.
- E Identifying a suspect early in an investigation before looking for confirming evidence.
思路引導 VIP
請試著思考：當一個人在判斷一件事情是否正確時，如果他的錯誤是因為『大腦自動過濾掉不喜歡的證據，只看自己想看的』，與『因為某個大人物說這話是真的，所以他就相信了』，這兩種錯誤在「思考過程」上有什麼本質上的區別？哪一個比較像是文中所說的「自我欺騙（fooling themselves）」呢？
🤖
AI 詳解
AI 專屬家教
恭喜你準確地辨識出選項中的差異！你能從眾多敘述中挑選出 (D)，說明你已經深刻理解了文中提到的「認知偏誤」（cognitive bias）核心：這是一種內部心理的過濾機制，讓我們不自覺地扭曲客觀事實，好讓結果符合既有的期待或成見。
認知偏誤的本質：內心的「濾鏡」
文中所描述的認知偏誤，如「動機性推理」（motivated reasoning），是指我們在處理資訊時，大腦會自動導向我們「想要」相信的結論。選項 (A)、(B)、(E) 都是典型的確認偏誤（confirmation bias），即只看支持自己的證據；而 (C) 則是心理學中的月暈效應（halo effect），同樣屬於主觀印象影響客觀判斷。相較之下，選項 (D) 雖然也是一種邏輯上的錯誤，但它屬於「訴諸權威」（appeal to authority）的邏輯謬誤。這是在論證時盲目引用外部來源，而非描述個體在處理觀察到的數據時，內心產生的主觀偏頗或自我欺騙。
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